This article considers the patterns of centralisation within the federal judicial system. While centralisation of legislative, executive and fiscal power within the federal system has been well documented, the architecture of judicial federalism has been the subject of less attention. The article, first, seeks to show that principles derived from Chapter III of the Constitution have, on the whole, exhibited broadly similar centralising characteristics and exerted centralising effects, and, secondly, offers explanations for this centralisation.
an institution independent of the two spheres of government, usually a court of final jurisdiction'. 23 While this focus on a division of power between two levels of government provides a marker of a federal system, for Aroney, it is an insufficient basis for studying and mapping federal systems of government. Drawing from the analysis of James Madison in Federalist No 39, Aroney adds additional federal markers. Most importantly for this article are 'the ... institutions adopted under the federation' (that is, the structure of the legislature, executive and the judiciary). 24 Importantly, each of these federal markers reflect accommodations of federal (or, more precisely, and to avoid confusion, 'confederal' 25) and national features. As explained by Madison in the American context, the confederal features of these markers were characterised by a distinctiveness of the constituent states within the federal system, whereas the national features were characterised by an emphasis on the aggregate nation that comprised the federal system. 26 Studies of Australian legislative and executive federalism have tended to focus on the expansion of federal power into areas traditionally regulated by the States and the benefits and costs associated with the uniformity which results from such centripetal tendencies. Given the federal dimensions that characterise the legislative and executive arms of government, questions of division of power (or, perhaps more accurately in the Australian context, the distribution of power) and uniformity of outcomes flowing from an expansion of federal power are a natural starting point. Aroney's analysis of Australian federalism takes the focus beyond questions of distribution, to consider the federal features of the structures of the federal legislature. 27 His work compellingly demonstrates the extent to which confederal and national elements were reflected in each of these constitutional dimensions.
This article picks up this scent and traces it through to judicial federalism. Part III further explores the institution of government not considered by Aroney in detailthat is, the judiciary -and will track the extent to which it is characterised by confederal and national features. Part IV will explore the principles developed by the High Court that exhibit a tendency to amplify the national features of the federal judicial system, and which have resulted in a marginalisation of the confederal features that recognised the distinctiveness of state judicial systems. In short, the article will demonstrate that the High Court has interpreted provisions of Ch III, and developed principles and implications arising from its text and structure, in a way that has led to increased centralisation of judicial power within the federal judicial system. Part V will then offer explanations, detected in the cases, for this centralising trend.
Before turning to develop that position, it is necessary briefly to sketch out the federal architecture of Ch III.
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Ibid 21-2. Other markers identified by Aroney are the 'formative basis of the Constitution' (that is, 'the process by which the Constitution was drafted') and the amendment process. This project has nothing to add in that respect. As Aroney explains, these federal markers were highlighted by James Madison in Federalist No 39 when defending the proposed US Constitution (at 21-2).
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And the formative basis for the Australian federal system and the amendment process, neither of which is particularly relevant to the judiciary.
III THE
FEDERAL ARCHITECURE OF CHAPTER III -
DISENTANGLING THE NATIONAL AND THE CONFEDERAL
It is clear that federalism is a central organising principle in Ch III, and that federal (both national and confederal) features can be seen operating at various levels. Four core features of that federal architecture will be introduced in this Part.
A Federal vs state judicial power First, and most obviously, as is the case in relation to the legislative power under Ch I and the executive power under Ch II, Ch III of the Constitution assumes two distinct sources of power and jurisdiction -federal and state. As French CJ and Gummow J This federal feature was designed to mirror the federal character of the judicial provisions in the United States Constitution. Consistently with that model, and with the conferral of legislative power on the federal Parliament, federal judicial power was to be limited to certain enumerated heads of jurisdiction that were appropriate to the federal level of government. The nine heads of federal jurisdiction, as set out in ss 75 and 76 of the Constitution, had appeared in the drafts presented to the 1891 Convention by Andrew Inglis Clark and Charles Kingston 3 and largely remained unchanged throughout the debates. C Federal structure of the federal judiciary -state courts to be 'federalised' Thirdly, the structure of the institution through which Commonwealth judicial power is exercised (that is, the federal judicature) is also federal in character. Unlike the other two federal arms of government, the federal judicial structure is complicated by the provision for the exercise of federal judicial power and jurisdiction by state courtsthe so-called 'autochthonous expedient'. 35 Until the Adelaide session of the 1897-8 Constitutional Convention, the institutional design of the federal judicature matched the United States model in art III of the US Constitution: only federal courts were to exercise federal judicial power.
However, the establishment of a complete set of lower federal courts would be an expensive proposition and, at least for Western Australia, the extra expense was creating apprehension. 36 The 'federalisation' 3 7 of state courts provided the answer, and the investiture of state courts with federal jurisdiction to exercise Commonwealth judicial power was accepted from that point forward. Thus, the second federal feature of Ch III can be seen in its structural design of the federal judicature. While the US model of federalism dictated a complete separation of federal and state courts, recognition of the practical difficulties of such a model in Australian conditions resulted in a unique federal model of institutional integration for the exercise of federal judicial power. The distinctiveness of state courts as repositories of state judicial power and jurisdiction was qualified by the desire for a national solution for the exercise of Commonwealth judicial power.
D High Court as a general court of appeal
While the first and second of these features emphasise the separateness or distinctiveness of the States, the third feature reflects, to a large extent, a national judicial structure for the exercise of federal jurisdiction: at least where the Parliament chooses to take up the option, state courts can exercise federal judicial power alongside (or instead of) lower federal courts.
The fourth federal feature is also a national one, and marks a second point of departure from the US model of federalism. Whereas the US Supreme Court only exercises appellate jurisdiction from state courts in relation to federal matters, under s 73 of the Constitution, the High Court operates as a general court of appeal from state Supreme Courts irrespective of whether the issue is federal or non-federal.
The establishment of a general court of appeal had long been on the agenda before the Constitutional Conventions of the 1890s. 38 Furthermore, as Quick and Garran noted, the drafters were 'accustomed to a common court of appeal in the shape of the Privy Council', and 'the advantages of having one uniform Australian tribunal of final resort outweighe[d] all feelings of localism'. 9 That the High Court was to have this general appellate jurisdiction was not in question, and the main debates surrounding s 73 concerned proposals to sever Australian appeals to the Privy Council. 40 The existence of that general appellate jurisdiction is an important national feature of federalism that finds its place in Ch III.
E Summary
Federalism is a defining feature of Ch III at multiple levels: in the separate identification of federal judicial power in relation to enumerated heads of federal jurisdiction and in contrast to the continuation of state judicial power and jurisdiction; in the recognition that federal and state courts are distinctive creatures of their respective bodies politic; in the structural integration of the federal judicature to include state courts when required by the federal Parliament to exercise federal jurisdiction; and in the integration of the judicial system through a general appellate jurisdiction.
IV PATTERNS OF CENTRALISATION
While Ch III was designed in a way to accommodate the competing federal conceptions of the confederal and the national (that is, separateness/distinctiveness vs aggregation/integration), the High Court has largely developed Ch III principles that erode the distinctive features of state judicial systems. As will be seen, we have a federal judicial system that is characterised by an expansion of federal judicial power, a convergence of institutional design and uniformity of outcome across judicial systems.
A The allocation of power the expanded reach of federal judicial power As mentioned, one of the defining features of the Australian federal judicial system is that there are two sources of judicial power and jurisdiction: federal and state. Despite the creation of Commonwealth judicial power, federal jurisdiction and a judicial system through which that power and jurisdiction are exercised, state jurisdiction and judicial power to be exercised by state courts retained a distinctive existence from the federal judicial system created by Ch III. This section will show that there has been an expansion of the jurisdictional opportunities for the exercise of Commonwealth judicial power, by both federal and state courts, at the expense of state jurisdiction and judicial power. The core platform for this centralisation of judicial power has been the development of the concept of accrued jurisdiction. 
Accrued jurisdiction
Federal jurisdiction is created and identified in ss 75 and 76 of the Constitution by reference to the word 'matter'. Parliament's power to vest additional federal jurisdiction in the High Court (s 76) and federal jurisdiction in lower federal courts (s 77(i)) and state courts (s 77(iii)) is conditioned by the existence of a 'matter'. In a series of cases in the early 1980s, 41 the High Court laid the foundations for an increased centralisation of judicial power by developing an expansive principle of 'accrued jurisdiction'. The pivotal concept of 'matter' was read by the Court to refer to the underlying 'justiciable controversy, identifiable independently of the proceedings which are brought for its determination and encompassing all claims made within the scope of the controversy', 42 whether federal or state-based. Furthermore, the Court took a relaxed approach for determining whether federal and state claims form part of the same 'matter': if they are non-severable, in the sense that they arise from the same substratum of facts, then a court will hear the state claim in 'accrued' federal jurisdiction.
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Thus, in short, where a federal claim and a state claim arise out of the same substratum of facts, the state claim falls to be decided within the same 'matter' of federal jurisdiction as the federal claim, and is determined with an exercise of Commonwealth judicial power. While there has been much concern expressed about the expansion of federal legislative powers in cases like Tasmanian Dam, 44 there has been little recognition that the High Court was, at the same time, expanding the jurisdictional opportunities for an exercise of Commonwealth judicial power. The expansion of these jurisdictional opportunities can be assessed through their impact, respectively, on federal courts and state courts.
Accrued jurisdiction and federal courts
The key High Court decisions in the early 1980s focused on the exercise by lower federal courts of jurisdiction over claims that otherwise would have been decided by a state court exercising state jurisdiction (for convenience, referred to hereafter as 'statebased claims'). The High Court had earlier dealt with questions of its own jurisdiction to consider state-based claims associated with claims falling within its jurisdiction. the framers ... looked to 'matters' in the broadest sense of the term as one which would catch up, as far as possible, the controversy which parties brought for determination by a court. It is highly unlikely that they intended to embrace a narrow technical meaning which would result in undue fragmentation of a total controversy, leaving its resolution to decisions by both state courts and this Court or state courts and federal courts. While cases on these jurisdictional issues subsided during the operational years of the cross-vesting schemes, which vested state jurisdiction in federal courts and vice versa, the invalidation of the conferral on federal courts of state jurisdiction in Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally 50 has given new life to the principles of accrued jurisdiction.
The consequence of these principles is that state-based claims which otherwise would have been litigated in a state court exercising state jurisdiction and power, can be litigated in a federal court if the state-based claims and federal claims are nonseverable. And, significantly, the High Court has adopted a liberal view of the connection needed for a state-based claim and a federal claim to be non-severable. Importantly for the purposes of this article, the federal court determines the statebased claim with an exercise of federal judicial power. The federal jurisdiction conferred to determine these 'matters' includes the authority to determine state-based claims that fall within the federal 'matter'. And, significantly, the High Court has held that state judicial power has not survived the vesting of state courts with federal jurisdiction in relation to matters set out in ss 75 and 76. The power in s 77(ii) of the Constitution (exercised through ss 38 and 39 of the Judiciary Act) to define 'the extent to which the jurisdiction of any federal court shall be exclusive of that which belongs to or is invested in the courts of the States' has been read by the Court to allow Parliament to strip state courts of state jurisdiction and invest them with federal jurisdiction under s 77(iii) to resolve the same matters. 52
Even when the federal provisions did not operate on their face to oust state jurisdiction in relation to a head of federal jurisdiction (for example, s 76(ii)), the survival of that remaining state jurisdiction was held to be inconsistent with the investiture of federal jurisdiction over that matter and, thus, had to give way. 53 Accordingly, the entire 'matter', comprising federal and state claims, is determined with an exercise of federal jurisdiction and judicial power.
Other centralising principles for the operation of federal jurisdiction
There is a range of other principles developed by the High Court that have enhanced the jurisdictional opportunities for an exercise of federal jurisdiction. First, as the High Court said in Agtrack (NT) Pty Ltd v Hatfield, 54 'federal jurisdiction may be attracted at any stage of a legal proceeding'. Thus, depending on the head of federal jurisdiction in question, federal jurisdiction may be triggered at the time proceedings are instituted, when the defence is filed, 55 when written or oral submissions are presented to a court 56 or when the matter goes on appeal to an intermediate court. 57 Secondly, once federal jurisdiction is triggered in good faith, it is not lost. This will be the case even if the claim triggering federal jurisdiction is unsuccessful. 5 8 Thirdly, whether federal jurisdiction has been attracted is a matter of 'objective assessment': it is not 'a question of establishing an intention to engage federal jurisdiction or an awareness that this has occurred'. 59 Thus, the litigating parties cannot choose to opt out of federal jurisdiction if it is otherwise engaged. There is also a low jurisdictional threshold for triggering two of the important heads of federal jurisdiction -ss 76(i) and (ii). In relation to federal matters under s 76(ii), the Court has held that a matter arises 'under any laws made by Parliament' 'if the right or duty in question in the matter owes its existence to federal law or depends upon federal law for its enforcement'. 60 Thus, in LNC Industries v BMW, the question was whether the NSW Supreme Court was exercising federal jurisdiction when considering a contractual dispute in circumstances where the subject matter of the contract was an import licence granted under Commonwealth regulations. The contract claim was a state-based claim, but the federal source of the contractual right involved was enough to trigger federal jurisdiction under s 76(ii). Amplifying the potential for s 76(ii) to be triggered is the expansive scope allowed to federal legislative power. The wider the scope of legislative power to create rights and obligations sourced in federal law, the greater the potential for disputes about those rights and obligations under federal law to be resolved with an exercise of federal jurisdiction. In turn, there is greater scope for state disputes to fall within accrued federal jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction in s 76(i) will be triggered 'in a case in which the giving of judgment in favour of one of the parties depends upon the outcome of two or more issues of which only one involves a constitutional question'.
61 This is so even if the case is decided on another basis without resolving the constitutional issue. Furthermore, the head of jurisdiction in s 76(i) will be triggered where 'the interpretation of a provision of the Constitution is relevant to the determination of a question of statutory interpretation', even in circumstances where the question of statutory interpretation is the only issue in the case.
6 2 As long as the constitutional interpretation is 'essential or relevant' to the statutory construction point, then federal jurisdiction will be triggered. 
Summary
This range of principles demonstrates the enhanced jurisdictional opportunities for an exercise of Commonwealth judicial power. The principles have expanded the reach of federal jurisdiction, both in federal and state courts. The expansion of federal jurisdiction in this way has resulted in a greater centralisation of judicial power. Furthermore, as will be explained in the next section, it has facilitated a convergence in institutional design of federal and state courts, with an exercise of federal jurisdiction being subjected to stringent separation of judicial power principles, whether in federal or state courts. Moreover, it provides the Commonwealth Parliament with the opportunity to control the exercise of that jurisdiction by choosing, under s 77(ii), to vest federal jurisdiction, embracing any claims within accrued jurisdiction, exclusively in federal courts. In Stack v Coast Securities (No 9),64 the High Court held that the exclusive conferral of jurisdiction under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) did not, as a matter of construction, extend to the accrued jurisdiction falling within the matter concerned. However, presumably, Parliament might choose to do so if it so wanted. 
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B Convergence of institutional design
The second way in which there has been a centralisation of judicial power has been through a convergence in institutional design. There were two distinctive institutional features of state judicial systems at 1900. The first distinctive feature was that, unlike the position at the federal level, there would be no entrenched division of power at the state level and no constitutional rules about which institution would exercise which power. The second distinctive feature was that the Privy Council would remain an integral part of state judicial systems. This section will explore how each of these distinctive features has diminished.
Converging constitutional constraints Separation of judicial power principles
The High Court has developed stringent separation of judicial power principles at the federal level. Commonwealth judicial power is to be exercised only by courts referred to in s 71 of the Constitution (the Alexander principle), 65 and courts exercising Commonwealth judicial power can only exercise judicial power or incidental nonjudicial power (the Boilermakers principle). 66 In developing these principles, the High Court has relied heavily on the rule of interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius; that is, Ch III exclusively sets out the repositories of Commonwealth judicial power and is the exclusive source of power that can be exercised by courts exercising Commonwealth judicial power. 67 Consequently, the Alexander and Boilermakers principles arise as negative implications from the text of the Constitution.
Importantly, these federal separation of judicial power principles apply as limitations on the federal Parliament only. Reliance upon the textual distribution of powers in the Constitution to ground the federal separation principles presents difficulties for the application of such principles at the state level: the logic of the argument deriving from Ch III can only apply to the federal arms of government. Furthermore, state constitutions are generally not entrenched, and so it is difficult to derive similar implications from any textual distribution of powers at the state level. Thus, distinctive features of our federal system were that state government power would not be constitutionally pigeon-holed into legislative, executive or judicial categories, and there would be no fixed constitutional understanding of how state power would be distributed across arms of government. Nevertheless, as will be explained, principles have been developed which have expanded the reach of the federal separation of judicial power principles, and have imposed limitations on what powers can be given to, and perhaps taken from, state courts.
Federal courts exercise federal jurisdiction over state-based claims
As explained earlier, the High Court has developed accrued jurisdiction principles which have enhanced the jurisdictional opportunities for federal courts to exercise federal judicial power in relation to state-based claims that would otherwise have been determined in a state court exercising state judicial power. The opportunities for the exercise of accrued jurisdiction have been magnified by the broad approach to federal heads of legislative power, expanding the matters that are within the reach of s 76(h) of the Constitution. Importantly, because the jurisdiction of lower federal courts, including its accrued jurisdiction, is federal jurisdiction conferred by the federal Parliament, the lower federal court must exercise its jurisdiction and power within the constraints of the federal separation of judicial power principles.
Separation of judicial power at the state level: when state courts exercise federal jurisdiction As further explained earlier, the High Court has also developed principles which have enhanced the jurisdictional opportunities for state courts to exercise Commonwealth judicial power. Again, in itself, this has resulted in a centralisation of judicial power. However, in addition to expanding the opportunities for an exercise of federal jurisdiction in state courts, the High Court has developed a theory about how state laws are applied by a state court when exercising federal jurisdiction. The Court appears to have accepted the idea that state Parliaments lack the constitutional power to prescribe what laws are to apply when a court -federal or state -is exercising On this theory, state laws cannot apply in federal jurisdiction of their own force, and must be picked up and applied as surrogate federal law by a Commonwealth provision. 69 However, the consequence of this theory of how state laws apply in federal jurisdiction is that the federal provisions, that pick up state provisions, must comply with the federal separation of judicial power principles: if the Commonwealth Parliament cannot confer non-judicial power on state courts because of the Boilermakers principle, it cannot pick up state laws that confer powers of the same character. Thus, the High Court has held that such provisions will not operate to pick up functions that are 'insusceptible of exercise as part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth'. In summary, the expanded reach of Commonwealth judicial power into state courts, along with the High Court's theory for how state laws are applied by state courts exercising federal jurisdiction, have allowed an increased infiltration of federal separation of judicial power principles to control and discipline the exercise of state judicial power.
Separation of judicial power at the state level -Kable principles
Although the federal separation of judicial power principles do not apply to state courts, one of the distinctive features of the Australian judicial system is that state courts are deeply embedded within the federal judicature: they are authorised by federal jurisdiction to exercise Commonwealth judicial power, and appeals are guaranteed from state Supreme Courts to the High Court. 73 These degrees of integration within the federal judicial system have been seen by the High Courtcommencing with the decision in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) 74 -to have consequences for what state Parliaments can do with their courts. Thus, although state courts are creatures of the States, and were intended to retain a distinctive identity within the federal system, they transcend their state-based status because of their inclusion within the federal judicial system. Their role within that system has been held to qualify their separateness and distinctiveness.
The development of these principles is well covered elsewhere 7 5 and will not be repeated in detail here. It is enough to say that state Parliaments are prevented from conferring powers on state courts if their institutional integrity would be undermined. Institutional integrity has been measured at least in part by independence, impartiality and fairness.
76 It may also be the case that state Parliaments will breach these principles if they regulate in a way that is 'repugnant to the judicial process in a fundamental degree'. application of the Kable principle are beginning to converge with the results that might be reached by applying a separation of powers approach'. 85 In summary, despite the inapplicability of the federal separation of power principles to the States, and the absence of an entrenched separation at the state level, the High Court has eroded this distinctiveness of state judicial systems. Of course, questions have already arisen, and will continue to arise, as to whether a tribunal is a 'court' for Ch III purposes. However, this line of cases suggests that the States may well face practical constraints when designing their dispute settlement systems in ways that shift judicial power from courts to bodies that do not satisfy the constitutional description of a 'court'.
The 'autochthonous expedient' as a further constraint
In addition to the constraining effects of the Kable principles, the investiture of federal jurisdiction in state courts pursuant to s 77(iii) of the Constitution may well present practical obstacles for experimentation with dispute settlement institutions at the state level. Questions have arisen as to whether state non-judicial tribunals can exercise judicial power in circumstances that would fall within a matter of federal jurisdiction set out in ss 75 and 76 of the Constitution.
Increased federal control over procedure and process
In addition to these convergences in the constitutional constraints applicable to federal and state courts, there has also been increased potential for federal control over judicial procedures and processes. The expanded opportunities for the exercise of federal accrued jurisdiction -both in federal and state courts -have enabled greater control by the federal Parliament of the procedures and processes through which the disputes (otherwise state, but now federal) are determined. This is most obvious in the case of federal courts where the Commonwealth Parliament has exclusive control of the constitution and organisation of federal courts and their procedures and processes. But even in the case of state courts exercising federal jurisdiction, the Commonwealth Parliament exerts, or has the potential to exert, substantial control over the exercise of that jurisdiction. Although the Parliament 'must take the State court as it finds it', 88 and is bound to accept 'the constitution of the Court' and the 'organisation through which its jurisdiction and powers are exercised', 89 Parliament can regulate the practice and procedure to be followed, and the rules of evidence to be applied, when the state court is exercising federal jurisdiction. The Commonwealth Parliament also can prescribe the number of judges who can hear a federal matter, 90 and the class of state court officers who can exercise federal jurisdiction. 91 The Commonwealth Parliament has generally provided for the picking-up of state rules of practice, procedure and evidence to matters of federal jurisdiction when heard in state courts. 92 However, its power to apply different rules is undoubted, leading to an increase in Commonwealth power over state courts.
Appellate pathways -the Privy Council and state judicial systems
It is well known that the respective place of the High Court and the Privy Council at the apex of the Australian judicial systems was deeply controversial. While the driving forces behind the federal movement sought to create the High Court as the ultimate court of appeal from all Australian courts, this proposal encountered resistance from the Imperial government, convention delegates, state Supreme Court judges and lobby groups, all favouring a retention of Privy Council appeals, particularly from state courts. 93 Compromises had already been made by the time the Australian delegates presented their draft constitution to the Imperial government in 1900 for enactment by the Imperial Parliament. In the proposal presented to the Imperial government, the High Court was intended to have the final word on constitutional questions (other than those raising imperial interests). Although appeals could go to the Privy Council from state courts, appeals on constitutional questions were to go to the High Court. Furthermore, although appeals could be taken from the High Court to the Privy Council if Her Majesty in Council granted special leave, Parliament was given the power to limit 'the matters in which such leave may be asked'. 94 The response of the Imperial government to the Australian proposal is well known, 95 and s 74 of the Constitution was amended before its enactment to preserve a greater role for the Privy Council. With appropriate leave, appeals could be taken from However, embedded within the provisions of Ch III was the power of the federal Parliament to make matters triggering federal jurisdiction exclusive to federal courts. Pursuant to ss 77(ii) and (iii), Parliament could make matters of federal jurisdiction exclusive to federal courts, thereby removing the opportunities for appeals to be taken to the Privy Council from state courts. This design was not accidental: the historical record shows that this was part of the compromise to resolve the deeply divisive issue of Privy Council appeals. 96 Despite this constitutional design, Parliament instead vested federal jurisdiction in state courts, but required any appeals in federal jurisdiction to be taken to the High Court. This attempt to limit the role of the Privy Council in state court federal jurisdiction cases resulted in a series of state court, High Court and Privy Council decisions tussling for the control of federal jurisdiction. 97 There is no need to cover that territory again here. It is enough to say that, while state courts and the Privy Council resisted the Parliament's attempts to channel federal jurisdiction appeals to the High Court, the High Court resolutely upheld the validity of Parliament's attempts to limit Privy Council appeals from state courts exercising federal jurisdiction. 98 Thus, rather than forcing Parliament to utilise lower federal courts for the exercise of federal jurisdiction as contemplated by the constitutional scheme, the High Court instead endorsed Parliament's attempt to limit the role of the Privy Council as the ultimate court of appeal from state courts when exercising federal jurisdiction, thereby eroding the distinctive institutional design of state court systems.
C Uniformity of outcome The discussion so far has shown how High Court decisions have expanded the jurisdictional opportunities for an exercise of Commonwealth judicial power and resulted in a convergence in institutional design of federal and state courts and a centralisation of power over judicial procedure and processes. In those respects, the national features of Ch III have been amplified and the confederal features (ie, state distinctiveness) have diminished. This centralising pattern can also be seen in the increased uniformity in the legal rules applied in federal and state courts. This can be seen in three ways. 
One common law
First, largely because of the place of the High Court at the apex of the integrated judicial hierarchy, it has been accepted that there is one common law throughout Australia. Thus, within our federal system, there is no possibility for divergent common law rules across federal and state courts. This was explained by Gaudron, Whatever may once have been the case in England the doctrine of precedent is now central to any understanding of the common law in Australia. To assert that there is more than one common law in Australia or that there is a common law of individual States is to ignore the central place which precedent has in both understanding the common law and explaining its basis. This Court is placed by s 73 of the Constitution at the apex of a judicial hierarchy to give decisions upon the common law which are binding on all courts, federal, State and territorial.
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In his influential work on the common law foundations of the Constitution, 101 Sir Owen Dixon had advanced the view that '[w]e act every day on the unexpressed assumption that the one common law surrounds us and applies where it has not been superseded by statute'.
1 02 For Sir Owen, this was a point of distinction between federalism in the United States and federalism in Australia. Federalism, Americanstyle, treats the common law as emanating from the separate sovereign status of the States, whereas the federal system in Australia was born into a unitary common law. The duty of all courts in Australia, Sir Owen said, was to recognise the common law as 'one system which should receive a uniform interpretation and application, not only throughout Australia but in every jurisdiction of the British Commonwealth where the common law runs'. 103 The anterior operation of the common law in Australia made it 'possible for an Australian to regard his country as governed by a single legal system ... composed of the common law, modified by the enactments of various legislatures'. 104 It was, in his view, an 'instinctive faith in the unity of the system and in the consequent need of uniform interpretations' that saw the establishment of the High Court as a general court of appeal.
1 0 5 Indeed, with this commitment to a unitary system of law, Sir Owen considered that the framers were misplaced in adopting 'the American distinction between State and Federal jurisdiction'. Instead, a judicial system might have been created, 'which was neither State nor Federal but simply Australian', to administer the totality of the law.
1 06 These views were referred to with approval in High Courtjudgments establishing the proposition that there is one common law in Australia.
107
It is not the purpose of this article to challenge or critique this view. As Professor Zines has said, 'the evidence by and large shows that at the time of federation the common law was conceived as a single body of law'. 10 8 Instead, the purpose of this article is simply to note that it was not the only view that was taken at the time of federation or which has been taken since. Andrew Inglis Clark, one of the Constitution's chief architects, was of the view that the common law would be part of the law of each State. 109 In a paper written in 1995, Justice L Priestley expressed a similar view: 'There is no reason why variant judicial decisions on common law rules may not occur in different States and thus create divergences in the common law of the States.' There is merit in this alternative view. Sir Owen's conception was based, in large part, on the unified common law throughout the Commonwealth. But, by the late 1960s, the Privy Council had accepted that the common law might develop divergently in different parts of the Commonwealth.
114 If it can fracture in this way, there is merit in the view that it can fracture even further within a federal judicial system. However, the point for present purposes is that the acceptance of one common law for Australia, determined by the High Court, further facilitates the centralisation of judicial power. Of course, the lex loci delicti rule only picks up the substantive law of the place of tort. Forum procedural laws continue to be applied by state courts. However the High Court has considerably narrowed the potential for real divergences in substantive outcomes across state courts by adopting a wide view of which laws are substantive in character. A law will be substantive if it affects 'the existence, extent or enforceability of the rights or duties of the parties'.
121 Thus, statutes of limitation and legislative caps on damages, considered prior to Pfeiffer to be procedural in nature, are now considered to be substantive. Consequently, the potential for divergent outcomes is considerably reduced.
D Summary
One aspect of the centralisation of judicial power in Australia has been the uniformity of outcomes that has been achieved across Australian courts. This uniformity has been achieved by the High Court's acceptance of a single system of common law rules applicable in Australia, the adoption of rules of precedent that smoulder diversity of common law rules across lower courts, and the development of choice of law rules that result in uniform outcomes across Australian courts. Along with the expansion in jurisdictional opportunities for the exercise of Commonwealth judicial power and the convergence in institutional design of Australian courts, the achievement of uniform outcomes further demonstrates the increased centralisation of judicial power in the Australian judicial system. On the whole, the national features of Ch III have been promoted and enhanced, and the confederal have diminished.
E Traffic going the other way It should be acknowledged that the High Court has recognised the distinctiveness of state courts in some contexts: three of which should be emphasised. First, as already mentioned, the Commonwealth must take a state court 'as it finds' it. As Gummow,
Hayne and Crennan JJ said in Forge v Australian Securities and Investments
Commission:122 '[t]he provisions of Ch III do not give power to the federal Parliament to affect or alter the constitution or organisation of State courts.' Thus, although the Commonwealth Parliament may vest federal jurisdiction in state courts and, to that end, define the scope of that jurisdiction and regulate the procedure and rules of evidence to be applied when the jurisdiction is exercised,123 it cannot regulate the constitution or organisation of state courts. 124 However, this recognition represents no more than a minimum core of constitutional protection for state courts against an unbridled application of the reasoning in the Engineers Case. By contrast, Isaacs J concluded that the majority's view was inconsistent with the 'occasionally forgotten' Engineers Case. 128 The position was well put by Brendan Lim in the following way:
State judicial institutions are understood to be components of the states in their constitutional conception, at least in the sense that a state's capacity to function as a government is understood to include the capacity to organise 'its own' courts and 'its own' judges.
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Secondly, the High Court held in Re Wakim 130 that state judicial power cannot be conferred on federal courts. While Ch III allows the federal Parliament to confer federal jurisdiction on state courts to exercise Commonwealth judicial power, there is no constitutional facility for state Parliaments to confer state jurisdiction on federal courts. Nor is there a constitutional facility for the federal Parliament to consent to such a conferral. It is now well known that, in Re Wakim, the High Court held that the express provision of Commonwealth power to invest state courts with federal jurisdiction gave rise to a negative implication that the reverse was not constitutionally permissible.
At first glance, the decision appears to quarantine state jurisdiction for exercise by state courts, thereby protecting and preserving the distinctiveness of state judicial power. However, in areas where there are political priorities for uniform schemes, the consequence of Re Wakim is to further enhance the potential for the replacement of state jurisdiction with federal jurisdiction. The circumstances considered in Re Wakim provide the perfect illustration. Uniformity in corporate regulation in Australia has been a long-standing political objective. Prior to Re Wakim, this uniformity was achieved by a co-operative arrangement across federal and state jurisdictions. Using its territories power in s 122 of the Constitution, the Commonwealth enacted a Corporations Law for the Australian Capital Territory. The text of that Corporations Law was then picked up by legislation in each State. The disputes that arose under those state Acts were disputes arising under state laws and usually 1 3 1 determined with an exercise of state judicial power.
Central to this co-operative Corporations Law scheme was the cross-vesting of jurisdiction: the vesting of federal jurisdiction in state courts and the vesting of state jurisdiction in federal courts. The cross-vesting of jurisdiction was designed to ensure that Corporations Law disputes were determined by the court in question without complicated jurisdictional issues arising. The consequence of the decision in Re Wakim was the referral of legislative power by the States to the Commonwealth Parliament for the enactment of a uniform corporations law in reliance on the referral power in s 51(xxxvii). This was achieved with the enactment of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Importantly, for present purposes, the disputes that arise under the Corporations Act give rise to matters of federal jurisdiction (embracing any state claims within accrued jurisdiction) under s 76(ii) of the Constitution and are determined by courts -whether federal or statewith an exercise of Commonwealth judicial power. The disputes that were, prior to Re Wakim, determined in state jurisdiction, are now determined in federal jurisdiction according to the disciplines imposed by the federal separation of judicial power principles, and the procedures and processes through which the disputes are resolved are now subject to federal control.
(1929)
Thirdly, in deciding whether non-judicial officers of state courts could exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth when vested in the relevant state court, the High Court initially took an approach protective of Commonwealth judicial power. The state 'court' that could exercise Commonwealth judicial power was said to be composed of judicial officers, and only judicial officers could exercise that power. Nevertheless, even here, there is convergence with the design of federal courts. In Harris v Caladine, 137 the Mason Court held that non-judicial officers of federal courts could exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth, and in supporting that view, a majority of the Court drew support from the Hospital Contribution Fund case allowing non-judicial officers of state courts to exercise Commonwealth judicial power. 138 Thus, the lack of symmetry in the principles led to the ratcheting down of federal principles to achieve convergence.
In summary, although the High Court, in some respects, has been protective of the distinctiveness of state judicial power and state courts, those occasions are relatively few and their impact cannot to be overstated.
V REASONS FOR THE CENTRALISING TRENDS
The article so far has sought to identify the centralising trends within the Australian judicial system. This has been a descriptive account of the complexion of judicial federalism in Australia. It is an account that largely tracks the centralising trends documented in other areas of Australian federalism, particularly legislative and fiscal federalism.
This final part of the article seeks to identify reasons for the centralising trends. The article does not seek to assess whether Australian judicial federalism has taken an ideal form: that is a much larger question. The purpose of this section is more modest: to identify the explanations apparent from the cases for these centralising trends. This section will offer three explanations: first, the centralising force of nation-building; secondly, rule of law concerns for litigants arising from multiple legal systems within a federal system; and, thirdly, the desire to give the federal Parliament a real and effective choice between federal and state courts for the exercise of federal jurisdiction.
A Nation-building As highlighted earlier, an expansion of federal jurisdiction has provided the platform for a centralisation of judicial power. The early cases exhibiting a preference for expansive federal jurisdictional principles were decided against the background of the delicate relationship between the High Court and the Privy Council discussed earlier.
In what is, perhaps, the first indication of an expansive jurisdictional principle, Isaacs J said in Pirrie that 'matter' should be read broadly to allow resolution of the whole dispute between the parties. This statement was made in the course of considering the validity of ss 38A, 40A and 41 of the Judiciary Act, which had been enacted in response to the congestion of state court, Privy Council and High Court decisions on the question of whether Parliament could prevent appeals going to the Privy Council from state courts exercising federal jurisdiction. Following a tense exchange of judicial opinion, in 1907 Parliament enacted those provisions to require inter se questions in state courts to be transferred to the High Court. Of course, for this mechanism to work, it was important to know when an inter se question was raised in a state court. Having set out the paragraph quoted earlier, Isaacs J concluded: 'If, then, the "matter" is once identified as falling under one or other of the specified heads, it is part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth, and may be dealt with as the Commonwealth Parliament has dealt with such matters in the sections under review'.
139
The early approach for determining whether an inter se question had arisen before a court for the purposes of s 40A of the Judiciary Act was a narrow one. For s 40A to operate, the inter se question did not 'arise' unless its determination was necessary in order to dispose of the case.
14 0 Similarly, in the earlier decisions of the High Court, a matter did not involve the interpretation of the Constitution under s 76(i) unless the matter presented 'necessarily and directly and not incidentally an issue upon its interpretation'. 14 1 These narrower approaches, however, 149 where the Court held that state jurisdiction is displaced in circumstances where it has been given federal jurisdiction to resolve the dispute, the question was whether s 39(2)(a) prevented an appeal to the Privy Council.
The rationale underlying the inter se cases was also relied on by the Court in Attorney-General (NSW) v Commonwealth Savings Bank 15 0 to support a more expansive view of when a matter arises under s 76(i) of the Constitution. Consequently, as already noted, the Court considered that a matter arose under s 76(i) even though the case was disposed of without the constitutional issue being determined or where the constitutional question was relevant to a question of statutory construction. The issue in Attorney-General (NSW) v Commonwealth Savings Bank was not whether an appeal to the Privy Council should be prevented by s 39(2)(a) of the Judiciary Act. Rather, the question was whether a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation could be removed to the High Court under s 40 of the Judiciary Act. Nonetheless, the Court relied upon the same rationale that was put forward to justify curtailing Privy Council appeals.
However, in the context of Ch III,157 the High Court has sought to give effect to it in a number of ways. First, and perhaps most obviously, the High Court has subjected the exercise of judicial power to separation of power disciplines and the rule of law ideas that underpin them. Separation of judicial power principles have been explained in a number of ways: all of which draw from the desire to have an independent and impartial judiciary. The expansion of jurisdictional opportunities for an exercise of Commonwealth judicial power along with the rules about how state laws apply in federal jurisdiction, operate in tandem to maximise the impact of the separation of judicial power disciplines. Even beyond the reach of federal jurisdiction, Kable has imposed these core rule of law values on state courts. Emerging Kirk principles may operate to isolate traditional judicial functions within state judicial systems that are subject to such disciplines.
The cases also exhibit other rule of law principles. As has been developed, one of the perennial tensions to be accommodated within a federal system is between the national and the confederal. One of the well-accepted benefits of a centralised federal system is that of uniform outcomes irrespective of locality. This is often presented as an efficiency argument, but it is also commonly presented as one that has benefits for the individual. In the context of judicial systems, the argument manifests itself as rule of law objectives of efficiency in the administration of justice and uniform outcomes irrespective of state of residence.
There is a clear flavour of this kind of rule of law argument across many of the areas outlined earlier in the article and, indeed, sometimes a recognition that the rule of law objectives must be weighed against the distinctiveness of state judicial systems. In deciding whether to attribute either a broad or a narrow content to 'matter', we should take into account that the adoption of the broad meaning will lead to the speedier determination of entire controversies between parties without undue duplication of proceedings. Perhaps the adoption of this view will have some adverse consequences for State courts, though this is by no means self-evident, but even if this be so, it is a consideration which is secondary to the interests of litigants. This circumstance is an additional reason for giving the word a broad rather than a narrow meaning. the resolution of their disputes. However, burdened as I am by that consideration, it seems to me that any other decision will not only offend the true intent and operation of the Constitution as established by its proper construction but diminish its effectiveness in maintaining a viable federation.
Other clear examples are found in the recognition of one common law, the rules of precedent that operate to minimise divergence and diversity in common law rules across jurisdictions and the choice of law context. In his preference for a unified common law, Sir Owen Dixon was guided by the 'efficient administration of justice'.160 His commitment to a unitary legal system led him to question the need for 'the American distinction between State and Federal jurisdiction'.161 The choice of law context is one where the underlying tension between uniformity and diversity is very well known. The application of different legal rules by different federal and state forums may lead to inconvenient results, increasing the costs of litigation and the expectations of the parties and their insurers. 162 The adoption of the law of the place of tort by the High Court in Pfeiffer was said to prevent those expectations being undermined 1 63 and provide 'practical solutions to particular legal problems which occur in the federal system'. 164 Rule of law arguments also surface, although less clearly, in the Kable judgments to justify the imposition of Ch III limitations on state Parliaments. Of course, as has been explained already, the Kable principles can be, in part, explained by an infiltration of the separation of judicial power values of independence and impartiality. However, there is also a rule of law thread to this reasoning that draws support from a preference for uniform outcomes disciplined by central constitutional requirements over uncontrolled state-based exercises of judicial power. Gaudron J's rejection in Kable of 'different grades or qualities of justice'165 reveals traces of this kind of rule of law explanation. McHugh J proposed a narrower proposition that there are not 'two grades of federal judicial power'. 1 6 6 However, it is Gaudron J's formulation that has found favour more recently in the majority judgments of the Court. 167
In these contexts, the interests of the litigants, derived from an efficient, predictable and uniform resolution of their disputes, was used to enhance the national features within Ch III at the expense of the distinctiveness of state legal and judicial systems. That is not to say that a rule of law argument should be accepted as a basis for centralising judicial power. The rule of law is notoriously an imprecise concept, and its acceptance as a constitutional assumption is suggestive, but not conclusive, of any clear constitutional rule. However, there is a clear thread within the cases to that effect.
C Giving Parliament a real choice for the exercise of federal jurisdiction Many of the developments discussed in Part IV can be explained along a very different line to the first two explanations identified so far. As a reminder, Parliament can vest federal jurisdiction in lower federal courts (s 77(i)) and/or utilise state courts for the exercise of federal judicial power (s 77(iii)). One thread that can be found in the cases is the idea that Ch III should be interpreted in a way that allows Parliament a real and effective choice when deciding to vest federal jurisdiction in federal or state courts. The interpretation of the word 'matter' provides a useful entry point into this idea. As already explained, the expansive view of the word 'matter' was adopted initially by a majority of the Court to preference the interests of the litigants over those of the States. However, perhaps in response to claims that the majority was relying on policy-rather than legal or constitutional -analysis, 168 the majority shifted its justification for a broad conception of the federal justiciable controversy from the interests of the litigants to the demands of an effective federal judicial system:
A central element in this design for the exercise of the judicial power of the Commonwealth is the power given to Parliament to make a choice between conferring federal jurisdiction on federal courts which it creates and investing federal jurisdiction in state courts. There is no indication in Ch III that the making of this choice was to be strongly weighted against the creation of federal courts in favour of investing federal jurisdiction in state courts, as it would be if the Constitution were to deny power to give authority to federal courts to decide the whole of a single justiciable controversy of which a federal issue forms an integral part. ...
It would ... restrict Parliament to the creation of federal courts lacking jurisdiction to determine such claims, thereby inhibiting their capacity as effective elements in the court system for which Ch III makes provision. The preferable approach from the viewpoint of principle is that established by authority, namely, to regard Ch III as empowering the Parliament to make sensible and practical dispositions for determination of justiciable controversies by either of the two means for which Ch III makes provision.
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Thus, the recognition and expansion of the concept of accrued federal jurisdiction in this way was designed to enhance the effectiveness of the choice available to the federal Parliament under s 77(iii) of the Constitution for the exercise of Commonwealth judicial power. 170 While favouring the interests of the litigants, this explanation is grounded firmly in the federal (national) architecture of Ch III.
Indeed, many of the centralising Ch III developments can be plotted along this plane. For example, uniformity of outcome (common law principles and choice of law rules) in federal and state courts might be supported on the basis that disparate outcomes might affect Parliament's choice between federal courts and state courts for the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Parliament can control the legal rules to be applied in state courts when they exercise federal jurisdiction, but it cannot control those rules when state courts exercise state judicial power. The possibility that the imposition of federal jurisdiction on state courts might lead to disparate outcomes depending on conclude by offering four brief comments on the implications arising from these centralising trends. First, High Court judges have been critical of the lack of understanding of federal jurisdiction amongst law graduates, practitioners and lower state courts.
1 ' 4 The provision of enhanced educational opportunities in relation to Ch III of the Constitution is an important step 'to alleviate that ignorance'.
1 75 Secondly, important policy questions are presented for the Commonwealth government as to how it uses its power to vest federal jurisdiction and to control processes, practices, procedures and choice of law rules in federal jurisdiction. For example, in Blunden v Commonwealth, the High Court was critical of the Commonwealth's failure to enact limitation rules for civil claims pursued in federal jurisdiction. 176 The Commonwealth Parliament certainly has more power than it currently uses.
Thirdly, there are very large implications for state governments, particularly in the design of their dispute resolution processes and institutions, whether courts or tribunals, and the use of courts and judges in non-traditional ways. The growing trend at the state and territory levels of transferring judicial jurisdiction to tribunals will, sooner rather than later, bring these implications into sharper contrast. Finally, if there is to be a federalism constitutional amendment agenda, judicial federalism needs to take its place alongside legislative and fiscal federalism. In its 2011 report, the Senate Select Committee on the Reform of the Australian Federation devoted very little space to the federal judicial system. 1 77 If the federal judicial system is to be reformed, important questions to be considered might include whether, on the one hand, state judicial systems should be capable of variation and experimentation in institutional design, or, on the other hand, whether we instead conceive of the judiciary in Australia, as Sir Owen Dixon once suggested, as an institution that should not have a federal character or be burdened by the American conception of federal jurisdiction. 177 See Senate Select Committee on the Reform of the Australian Federation, above n 3.
